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United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

12 || Plaintiff,

13

14 JESUS PANIAGUA,

Defendant

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00277-DAD-BAM

**STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
FINDINGS AND ORDER**

DATE: June 30, 2020

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Dale A. Drozd

17 This case is set for change of plea on June 30, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued
18 General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further
19 notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18
20 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s
21 judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after
22 May 2, 2021.¹ This and previous General Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial emergency,
23 were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

24 Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health
25 concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision
26 "counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness." "demand[ing] on-the-record

¹ A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

1 findings” in a particular case. *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-
2 record findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such
3 failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153
4 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit
5 findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

6 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory
7 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial
8 emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the
9 judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such
10 action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.
11 § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of
12 the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of
13 such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.*

14 The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.”
15 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address
16 continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has
17 discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-
18 week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d
19 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed.
20 *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to
21 exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).
22 The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated
23 by the statutory rules.

24 In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following
25 case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-
26 justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).² If continued, this Court should designate a new date

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29 ² The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make
“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D.
Cal. March 18, 2020).

1 for the change of plea. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial
2 continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

3 **STIPULATION**

4 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and
5 through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

6 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on June 30, 2020.

7 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the change of plea until July 20,
8 2020, and to exclude time between June 30, 2020, and July 20, 2020, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A),
9 B(iv) [Local Code T4].

10 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

11 a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case
12 includes investigative reports and jail calls. All of this discovery has been either produced
13 directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

14 b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and
15 finalize a potential resolution of the case. A resolution has been reached in principle, but counsel
16 for defendant requires additional time to formally execute the change of plea agreement.

17 c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested
18 continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into
19 account the exercise of due diligence.

20 d) The government does not object to the continuance.

21 e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the
22 case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the
23 original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

24 f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,
25 et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 30, 2020 to July 20, 2020,
26 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]
27 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of
28 the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest

1 of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

2 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the
3 Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial
4 must commence.

5 IT IS SO STIPULATED.

6 Dated: June 26, 2020

7 McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney

8 /s/ LAURA JEAN BERGER
9 LAURA JEAN BERGER
10 Assistant United States Attorney

11 Dated: June 26, 2020

12 /s/ BENJAMIN A. GERSON
13 BENJAMIN A. GERSON
Counsel for Defendant
14 JESUS PANIAGUA

16 **FINDINGS AND ORDER**

17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 Dated: June 26, 2020



19 _____
20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE